On the wake of felonious groups besieging Haiti’s largest penitentiaries and liberating upwards of 3,800 convicts, the Haitian government declared a three-day state of emergency and an overnight curfew on Sunday. However, the government’s future is ominously uncertain, given gangsters now de facto control about 80% of the capital and high-ranking individuals such as Prime Minister Ariel Henry, who is also the de facto president, are out of the country.
Arguably, Haiti’s journey to recoup from lawlessness rests on an internationally recognised UN-sanctioned security force, spearheaded by a 1,000-strong Kenyan police team, with the mandate to subdue the gangs. But news of their coming has prompted a peace agreement between the feuding gangs and a vow to apprehend the police chief and cabinet members.
The root of the crisis dates back seven years, when Haiti last conducted an election, it’s been nearly three years since President Jovenal Moïse was assassinated and more than one year since the final elected officials vacated their positions. The return of democracy to Port-au-Prince is still a far off goal.
This crisis can directly link its roots to the killing of Moïse, but its origins are even deeper entrenched: to the financial disaster following the earthquake of 2010, the oppressive 29-year leadership of the Duvaliers, and even the significant burden of the extensive “recompense” that Haiti was obliged to provide to France for generations post 1804 independence, which critically impeded economic growth.
Last year, Prof. Matthew Smith, a historian of Haiti from University College London, stated: “Haiti’s history can be viewed as a chain of crises interspersed with short intervals of hope and tranquillity,” regardless, “the circumstances are unprecedented in Haiti’s chronicles.”
Over the previous year, the situation has escalated. Close to 4,000 individuals were murdered and another 3,000 abducted due to gang-related disputes in 2023, as per the UN; there’s an abundant incidence of sexual violence, with women victim to over 1,100 attacks by October. Approximately 200,000 individuals have been uprooted, and half of the Haitian populace is experiencing a food crisis. Fundamental services like electricity, potable water and waste collection are undependable. By the end of 2023, it’s anticipated that the economy will have shrunk for a fifth year in a row.
Events of recent days have led to heightened gloom. Diego Da Rin, a specialist on Haiti at the International Crisis Group who recently conducted an exploratory mission for his crisis report, noted: “Conditions have significantly worsened due to the prison assault, along with other synchronised hostility towards state entities. Government structures including police stations have been set ablaze, the chief airport has been assaulted and there are threats to capture the national palace.”
The considerable influence of the gangs is concerning, in the wake of the death of Moïse, Haiti’s Prime Minister, Henry, filled the presidential void but his leadership is largely seen as fraudulent, hampering his ability to successfully conduct vital elections. This absence of accountable governance has allowed the strong gangs space to broaden their command in the capital. The competing coalitions – G9, headed by ex-elite policeman Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier, and Gpèp, that lacks a definitive leader, have been engaged in a power struggle over the city.
However, the local police are at a disadvantage, with around 10,000 on-duty officers countrywide compared to the United Nations suggested requirement of roughly 26,000. In the previous year, approximately 1,600 officers renounced their role.
Unfortunately, the situation was further complicated by the UN security council’s October resolution to dispatch an international security force to Haiti to counteract the gangs. According to Da Rin, this initiative exacerbated the aggression, as both factions attempted to secure additional territories ahead of the force’s arrival. “Their objective was to demonstrate their dominance, bring the government to its knees and intimidate the incoming troops,” he explained. Currently, the two major groups have reinstated a pact of non-hostility as they aim to dethrone the interim Government whilst solidifying their dominance.
What impact can an international security force have in Haiti?
The announcement by the UN in support of an international force, helmed by Kenya, spurred some hope that they could stand up to the gangs. This initiative isn’t considered a formal peacekeeping battalion of the UN, primarily due to the distressing consequences of previous UN missions. They had been tainted by shocking allegations of sexual misconduct while a cholera epidemic, leading to close to 10,000 fatalities, was linked to a contaminated UN camp.
[ UN chief apologises to Haiti for agency’s role in cholera outbreak ]
The aspiration for the force was not to eradicate the gangs, instead the aim was to reassert control over critical entry and exit paths to the capital, safeguard governmental infrastructure, and establish a stable security situation. Yet, warnings surfaced indicating the substantial preparation that any incoming force would need in order to manage the gangs in a complex urban environment, where gang members often dress in regular attire and are challenging to differentiate from civilians.
“As the operation will face a highly intricate issue,” said Da Rin, underscoring the new additions would need to deal with both the gangs and Bwa Kale. The latter is a grassroots civilian vigilante group associated with public executions of alleged gang members.
Nevertheless, he stated that the gangs were genuinely “fearing for their lives” when confronted with the potential new antagonist. “They are aware of the Haitian police’s weakness, but the prospect of support by a foreign force better trained and equipped worries them.”
Why hasn’t the force been established?
Five months post receiving a UN mandate, the force hasn’t established any ground presence and the initial approval is only for a period of twelve months. “Since October 2nd, we’ve been racing against time,” commented Da Rin. “There should have been adequate time to train, supply, and appoint both funds and personnel.”
A significant issue, however, arose from Kenya where the Government pledged to contribute 1,000 police officers to manage a prospective force of up to 5,000 personnel. However, they were hit with a legal decision declaring the scheme unconstitutional. To rescue the plan, last week Henry travelled to Nairobi to seal a renewed deal with William Ruto, Kenya’s president.
Henry’s leave from Haiti seems to have prompted the gang’s attack on the prisons. His return timeline is currently uncertain. There were reports of escalating fears due to rumours of his return on Monday, which led to businesses shutting down and increased police patrols.
In addition, Benin offered to contribute a further 2,000 personnel, though “they seem to have pledged these troops quite recently, hence it’s uncertain if training has commenced,” Da Rin pointed out. He added that “The issue not only lies in securing sufficient troops, but also in garnering the necessary funding to ensure the mission’s full operation.”
It could take several months to implement the proposed plan, according to the information available. Indications suggest that Kenya might withhold its officers until complete financing is secured, and as Da Rin puts it, the mission might be impossible without a guiding country. He warns that the chances of success might dwindle soon without decisive action.
Da Rin also postulated a potential course of action for Barbecue and other gang chieftains, suggesting they might endeavour to recast themselves as political actors working for the welfare of the Haitian populace. He said this could eventually result in a successful talk-down or even amnesty. However, he noted, with gangs currently holding a significant advantage and the Haitian citizens bearing the brunt of their atrocities for a prolonged time, it would be a gargantuan task to help the public comprehend any negotiations with these nefarious elements. A prudent approach, he suggests, would be to first initiate the mission, and then start negotiation proceedings from a position of relative power.
Amidst this, the enthroned political opposition appears to be skeptical of Henry’s claim to organize elections by August 2025. A lack of confidence in Henry’s word is palpable, as noted by Da Rin, and it would require substantial effort from regional entities to persuade them to re-engage in discussions with him.
However, such political dialogues seem to be an indulgence in the present scenario. Da Rin stressed the emergency of the situation, stating the possibility of the gangs dominating the entire capital in a few days or weeks if their large-scale assaults continue unabated.