In recent weeks, the prowess of Israeli intelligence and the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) has been made evident by a series of actions; ranging from communications intersections in Lebanon to precision strikes, one of which resulted in the death of Hizbullah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah. This has significantly strengthened the counteractive force that sustained substantial damage on October 7th, where the border to southern Israel was breached by Gaza-based Hamas fighters amidst meagre resistance.
As Israel commemorates the first anniversary of the tragedy that took 1,200 lives, predominantly civilians, on October 7th, doubts persist about how an army with such capacity was caught by surprise. It is known that the attack by Hamas, involving a mass smuggling of weapons into Gaza via Egypt and extensive tunnel construction, had been years in the making. In the run-up to the invasion, various warnings were provided by the intelligence sector, but these were dismissed due to a prevailing assumption that Hamas was deterred from assaulting Israel.
In a statement released on October 1st, 2023, Israel’s National Security Advisor, Tzachi Hanegbi, noted that there had been a lapse of two years since Hamas had begun any missile launches and the degree of violence had reduced in an unprecedented manner. He further commented on Hamas’s restraint and their understanding of potential consequences of further insubordination, just days before the unexpected onslaught.
The leadership of Israel held the belief that, even though Hamas was deeply entrenched in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Jihadist principles, their tenure in power in Gaza had had a tempering effect, and their focus had shifted to catering to the basic needs of more than two million residents of Gaza. The flow of substantial funds from Qatar to Gaza, paired with an estimated 18,000 Gazans entering Israel every day for employment – with wages that vastly exceeded those available in the economically-stricken coastal strip – led Israel to believe that these incentives had dissuaded Hamas from triggering another violent outbreak.
Complemented by state-of-the-art boundary security systems, the billions of euros spent resulted in installation of a formidable 48-meter underground wall in 2021. This was designed to counteract cross-border tunnel attacks from Hamas. Electronic sensors and video surveillance along the fence would trigger alarms upon the approach of any potential threat. Should the threat rise above ground, the remote-control machine guns stationed in concrete towers stationed were prepared for retaliation. The prevalent belief was that the boundary was impenetrable.
Curiously, Hamas leaders indulged in this Israeli fallacy while ironically strengthening their arsenal and strategising an invasion far more severe than any previous clashes with Israel.
Gradually, the troop count on the border was thinned out, leaving only a small security detail in border locations. To prevent theft, their weaponry was stored securely in a locked room. Greater deployment of Israeli soldiers along the border might have been able to hold off the oncoming force of Hamas troops after they entered, but army resources were mobilised from the Gaza outskirts to pacify severe disruptions in the West Bank during the weeks building up to the 7th of October.
As dawn broke on October 7th, approximately 25 IDF combat battalions, significantly less than four IDF units equating to 600 soldiers, guarded the extensive Gaza border. Two days prior, on October 5th, two premier commando companies of over 100 soldiers had been relocated to the West Bank.
Using bulldozers and explosives, around 3000 Hamas militants created breaches at 30 spots in the fence, while drones targeted and destroyed Israel’s border surveillance cameras during a large-scale mortar offensive. IDF observers had previously noted and reported similar Hamas practises of breaching the border fence and infiltrating Israel, but these reports were overlooked. Hamas also broadcasted a television programme that depicted the process of a cross-border attack, complete with taking Israeli residents hostage.
Despite receiving intelligence about Hamas operatives switching their mobile phone sim cards to Israeli ones in the hours leading up to the attack, this valuable information was also disregarded.
Rigorous training was undertaken by thousands of Hamas fighters who would partake in the operation, yet to avoid spies, they only received the details at the early morning mosque prayers at 4 am on the day of the attack. Purposefully, the Hamas leaders in Gaza chose not to inform their overseas leadership or allies in Hizbullah and Iran about the timing of the impending attack.
The intelligence unit of Israel was equipped with ample advance indications, yet they disastrously failed to form a coherent picture. This intelligence failure is strikingly similar to the infamous 1973 Yom Kippur war, where pronounced signs of an impending Egyptian offensive were blatantly overlooked, under the assumption that Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat was not in favour of starting a war. The events that transpired on October 7th took place exactly 51 years and a day after the onset of the Yom Kippur war.
As the assault progressed, the army’s response was disappointingly insufficient, leaving the besieged communities to fend for themselves for several hours before additional support arrived. There was a marked absence of a contingency plan for such circumstances. Former national security advisor Yaakov Amidror pointed out, “The army does not prepare for situations it deems impossible.”
The main objective of the Hamas invaders was to overthrow the IDF’s Gaza unit base at Re’im, situated near the border. Once this site was taken, the army struggled to evaluate the overarching situation and distribute additional forces promptly. Mayhem broke out when the command hierarchy overseeing all regional military operations failed to perform optimally. Numerous armed civilians and soldiers voluntarily moved south, forming spontaneous units to aid the assaulted communities. However, Hamas held control over approach routes and set up lethal traps.
Israel’s Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu has rejected demands for an autonomous body — a state level inquiry commission with extensive powers — to investigate the blunders that lead to the events of October 7th. He is apprehensive that such an institution may pin the blame on him. Netanyahu insists that a comprehensive review, inclusive of his own involvement, can be conducted post-conflict. His detractors assert that his reasons for maintaining Israel at a state of war are to stall the proposed investigation. To date, Netanyahu is the only high-ranking personage within the political, military and intelligence ranks who has not accepted personal liability.
Earlier this year, Maj Gen Aharon Haliva, formerly the head of IDF’s military intelligence, was the inaugural general to admit fault and tender his resignation. He acknowledged that the military intelligence organisation under his command did not succeed in triggering an alarm about the terror act by Hamas. He admitted, “We did not accomplish our primary purpose. This dark moment haunts me, around the clock, day after day, night after night. The horrific agony of the war will remain with me indefinitely.”
Subsequent to the assault by Hamas, Gadi Eisenkot, ex-chief of staff for IDF, joined the war cabinet. He expressed that every person in a position of power ought to abdicate their position. He commented, “The magnitude of the failure is so significant that their continuation in their roles is untenable,” he stated.