The age-old statement regarding New England’s capricious weather – simply be patient if it’s unsatisfactory, could adequately illustrate current US foreign policies. This instability is being cleverly manoeuvred by other nations.
It is plausible for President Joe Biden not to dismiss the notion that Binyamin Netanyahu might be stalling a Middle East ceasefire in anticipation of a potential return of Donald Trump. This is due to the possibility that Trump’s leadership might permit the Israeli prime minister more leeway. Similarly, it’s not outside the realm of possibility to speculate that Vladimir Putin might have been stalling for Trump’s return to power for more than two years.
One may condemn the cynical strategies of these international heads of states, but their conduct is a result of existing discrepancies between the policies of Democrats and Republicans. The recent ineffectiveness of Biden’s administration hinges more on this internal US division than Biden’s senior age or the cunningness of leaders in less powerful nations. It’s a systemic issue rather than a matter of individual personalities, making it a potential concern for future leaders as well.
Aside from the nation’s diminished global production, the fickle nature of America’s foreign policies is a major constraint on its power. Volatile diplomacy doubly undermines the US. Firstly, it tempts unprincipled leaders to tolerate the current president while awaiting a more accommodating one. Secondly, for other countries, navigating around the US is far trickier compared to dealing with China, its superpower counterpart.
Netanyahu’s case is a potential example of the first dilemma. Southeast Asia’s dwindling respect for the US, as reflected in local elite surveys, could evidence the second issue. The US has shown fluctuating attention to this key area, demonstrating enthusiasm for transpacific trade before miserly limiting access to its domestic market, and presenting an initially ambiguous stance on Taiwan under Trump’s rule to then adopting a vocal position under Biden. Even something foundational, like whether democracy is favoured in Washington, shifts with each administration. This is particularly pertinent as ASEAN regimes frequently teeter on the brink of democratic and autocratic governance.
Reflecting on the inconsistent stance of America, it’s evident there has been considerable oscillation on global issues, especially climate change. When examining the manipulation of policies, it’s easy to see the instability — In 1998, Bill Clinton gave his approval to the Kyoto Protocol, only for George W Bush to pull out three years later. Barack Obama then ratified the more expansive Paris Pact in 2015, only for Trump to withdraw in 2017. However, in 2021, Joe Biden recommitted to the accord as one of his initial presidential acts. If Trump backs off again, as rumours in recent months have inferred, it will mark the fifth time in a generation that US policy on a globally significant issue has reversed.
Observers from global cities like Beijing or Moscow might shake their heads and contend, “Well, that’s what you get with multi-party elections…” However, sudden policy reversals aren’t inherent in democratic governance. The US was historically capable of transitioning governments every couple of years while preserving profound philosophical unity. From 1945 to 2016, all American heads of state favoured Nato, European amalgamation, Bretton Woods agencies, and a global network of military bases. Notably, even the ill-fated Vietnam War had bipartisan support. The idea that ‘eastern’ autocracies contemplate in centuries-long cycles beyond the grasp of volatile democracies, is ill-conceived. If such were the case, why haven’t more such systems endured?
The crux of the problem isn’t necessarily democracy on its own. It revolves around the heightened sense of partisanship pervading the US. The divergence in parties is particularly striking regarding trade — While the favourable outlook towards trade has been dwindling in Washington, the Democrats advocate a highly-restricted, localised economic paradigm; in contrast, Trump hints at a pronounced 20% tariff on all imported goods. Navigating these waters is a challenge for a moderately-sized, non-western state. Furthermore, it’s not as if there isn’t another superpower that they could align with.
Essentially, if the US Diplomatic Corps was to be completely manned by career bureaucrats, there could at least be a tempering of disparities across administrations. However, presently, such coveted roles are often ‘political,’ exacerbating, rather than alleviating, the partisanship discontinuities.
It’s recognisable that the flexibility of American policy is particularly evident in Ukraine. Many suggest that the final resolution to the conflict depends on securing unoccupied Ukraine under NATO protection or similar, which they argue is practical and reflects 20th century strategies. However, the effectiveness of such a safety assurance largely depends on a future American president’s commitment to uphold it. Might Trump or a Trump-like figure uphold this? It’s worth considering, as his foreign dealings are more nuanced than the simplistic “isolationist” label might suggest. Even traditionalists within his party might acknowledge that abandoning such a pledge could jeopardise America’s international credibility. Yet, the very posing of this question underlines existing uncertainty. The US has relied not only on its power, but also its predictability – without which, its influence is diminished.
In this new era, the remarkable achievement has been the minimal economic impact of America’s political divisions. This nation has outpaced Europe, despite the absence of a peaceable transfer of power in the most recent election. The country lacks substantial internal motivation to address these domestic divides. However, their geopolitical toll, their influence on America’s consistency abroad and the related repercussions for its global leadership, are serious issues. While it has always been simple to find someone to speak with in the USA, unpredictability around who is on the other end is becoming progressively more important.
-Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2024