Despite their deep animosity, Israel and Hizbullah have steered clear of escalating to full-scale warfare. Evidently, the timing is yet to be ripe for either party to commit to such an action. This was once again underscored during the severe episodes of conflict that took place on the Israel-Lebanon border last Sunday, which teetered them on the brink of war. Nonetheless, they demonstrated restraint and declined to progress further.
The offensive on Sunday was a considerable exchange wherein Israel deployed a hundred jets, which executed a seven-hour long operation bombarding over 40 sites using missiles. Yet, merely three fatalities were noted by that evening. It was evident that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were more cautious about the casualties inflicted upon Lebanese civilians in comparison to previous actions in Gaza.
While Israel vows to fight until Hamas is completely annihilated, its foreign minister, Israel Katz, firmly stated last Sunday that there was no official desire to engage in an existential battle with Hizbullah.
Meanwhile, even though Hizbullah reported launching 320 rockets and an ample number of drones, the damage inflicted was minimal, with a sole Israeli death caused by an interceptor missile. Nevertheless, the Lebanese Shia militia claimed they accomplished their ends, retaliating for a commander slain by Israel the previous month. They remained steadfast, stating that the Israeli airstrikes didn’t hinder their plans. The objective of this announcement was to establish an end to the day’s hostility and alleviate the pressure on Hizbullah to prolong the conflict.
Neither party seems eager to ignite a war presently. Israel, still embroiled in the Gaza situation with Hamas and with rising tensions in the West Bank incited by aggressive settler movements, lacks the capacity to handle another conflict.
It’s widely understood among IDF leaders that a victorious campaign against Hizbullah would necessitate a ground assault, a move which could lead to significant Israeli casualties. Notwithstanding recent refurbishments, Israeli tanks remain susceptible to entrapment and ambush.
Israeli Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu recognises that the ongoing conflict can serve as a smokescreen, shielding him from both impending court cases related to corruption allegations as well as public scrutiny. Following Sunday’s successful operation, he and his security cabinet may contemplate additional missions. However, this is far from a commitment to deploying Israeli infantry across the border, or inciting missile strikes from Hizbullah on cities like Tel Aviv.
Hizbullah, for their part, have key political and economic assets within Lebanon, which would likely suffer considerable damage in a war against Israel. Their supporting ally, Iran, is also evidently unprepared for such a conflict and has currently postponed its pledged retaliation to Israel’s assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, a Hamas political leader, in Tehran last month.
The destructive tendencies exhibited by Yahya Sinwar, the commander of Hamas in Gaza, who initiated an unexpected attack on Israel on October 7th, are not mirrored by Hizbullah and Iran. Sinwar’s flawed assumption that his Beirut and Tehran allies would join the fight has proven incorrect.
Both Israel and Hizbullah may not be keen for a full-scale war at present, but that doesn’t eliminate its possibility. Their crude way of communication – primarily through the use of high explosives – leaves a massive margin for error.
This past weekend’s incident stands as a reminder of the likelihood of unforeseen outcomes. If the IDF’s account is accurate, their fighter jets neutralised numerous Hizbullah attack plans in central Israel by destroying several launch pads. Had any of these planned attacks claimed sizable casualties, mounting public pressure may have left the Netanyahu government with no choice but to launch an operation to eradicate Hizbullah from southern Lebanon.
There is the greatest opportunity for mistakes when each party attempts to predict the other’s internal political manoeuvres. For instance, understanding Hizbullah’s response to Israel’s assassination of their commander Fuad Shukr by airstrike in south Beirut last month was impossible. Questions lingered regarding the quantity of rockets or missiles they would find adequate for retaliation and their potential targets. A decision by Netanyahu to further the bombing poses the danger of prompting Iranian interference siding with its ally.
Equally, Hizbullah’s bombardment that forced over 80,000 Israelis to vacate their residences leaves Hizbullah second-guessing the political pressure this will place on the Netanyahu coalition to conquer southern Lebanon, facilitating the return of the uprooted citizens.
Amidst this bilateral risk-taking, the US is fervently striving to minimise the danger. The Biden administration, since October 7th, has concentrated its efforts to prevent the Gaza war escalating into a regional conflict, which they claim has been effective. Encouraging caution amongst allies while deploying its forces in the region to dissuade adversaries encapsulates Washington’s strategy, or rather, their fundamental aspiration throughout this crisis. They hope that a negotiation trading hostages for peace in Gaza might equally resolve the intensifying disagreement on Israel’s northern frontier.
Despite recent evidence to the contrary, negotiations continue this week with US officials maintaining that an agreement is attainable. Yet, there are significant reservations about whether Netanyahu or Sinwar genuinely desire a ceasefire. Conflict can erupt without both parties desiring it; unfortunately, the same can’t be said of peace.