There’s another Donald T. in play who doesn’t get quite enough attention. Donald Tusk deserves our admiration for his provocative leadership in Poland between 2007 and 2014, a period during which Poland made impressive strides towards the living standards enjoyed by Western Europe. As his second term unfolds, the Ukraine finds in him a tireless advocate. There’s talk of Poland succeeding Britain as a pro-market, pro-American, and martial force within the EU; an assertion that makes one quiver in their boots. Granted, as it stands, Poland has less than half the population of Britain and a lower diplomatic prowess too. However, such shortcomings are mitigated by Tusk’s comfort within the top Brussels political circles.
The one thing Europe certainly isn’t lacking in its endeavour to be a formidable power is assertive leadership. Take for instance Ursula von der Leyen, who has shown herself to be an efficacious wartime European Commission president, or Emmanuel Macron, who after much introspection has realised the unrelenting nature of the Kremlin. British politics, too, with both Rishi Sunak and Keir Starmer so united on the Ukraine issue, it’s barely even up for debate. The potential for Italian populist, Giorgia Meloni, to apologise for Russia simply doesn’t exist. Similarly, despite being labelled a procrastinator, Olaf Scholz has seen Germany swiftly become the most generous military aid provider to Ukraine during his tenure.
In an imperfect political landscape where one could potentially draw allusions to a faltering Franco-German alliance, such divisions hardly make a dent in the real issue: which, regrettably, is us. Europe has a need for military reinforcement that will either mean increased taxes or cuts to welfare for its citizens. To gauge the likelihood of this happening, remember the vehement protests in France against austerity measures: the 2018 fuel tax and the public pension age increase scheduled for 2023.
The UK’s tax load is rather weighty, given its own benchmarks, even after the right-leaning government’s 14-year rule. Similarly, Germany’s highly lauded economic structure, particularly by Britain’s gullible left, surprisingly stakes its claim on Russian supplies and Chinese consumption. Given such economic constraints, not even considering the expenses of the eco-friendly transition, are we to believe that the electorate would prioritise building up military strength?
Drawing from the words of Donald Rumsfeld, the erstwhile US defence secretary, there is a “new” Europe on the horizon. In Russia-vulnerable eastern and central Europe, constituents are ready to sacrifice other aspects in favour of military power. Yet, the destiny of Europe largely rests on the shoulder of those handful countries with a population exceeding 60 million. There’s minimal indication that their voters are prepared to disrupt the welfare-oriented social agreement to amass arms.
Europe, in a way, has already subtly accepted this truth. It could have deprived Russia of revenue following the Ukraine invasion or imposed sanctions on energy imports. But the decision-maker believed the electorate couldn’t bear the brunt of skyrocketing utility bills or the postponed taxes required to subsidise them. This judgement undeniably rings true, which is the crux of the matter.
You may argue that leaders should take the helm instead of merely following the current, but such an idealistic perspective of politics seldom holds water. Allow me to deviate and reveal an industry secret: the most difficult portion of penning an unsigned newspaper editorial is the concluding third. After outlining an issue – for instance, migration – it becomes necessary to propose a remedy. However, these problems persist because solutions are hard to find. If one does exist, it’s bound to be unpalatable. Thus, the only logical conclusion is a plea for enhanced “leadership”.
In politics, the alleged power of leaders to sway public opinion is often exaggerated, as historical cases such as Franklin Roosevelt’s attempt to involve the American populace in WWII before the decisive moves of the Japanese empire demonstrate. The limits for feasible action are primarily dictated by the voting population, whose views might be altered by tangible events, not high-flown discourses. Major external changes are necessary for nations such as Britain and Germany to view defence expenditure as an urgent concern, in the same vein as the Poles and Estonians.
Fortunately, the leadership in Europe appears efficient when compared with their American counterparts, having shown significant ideological transformation within a span of two years. Once proponents of trade as the ultimate tool for resolving conflicts, they have now embraced the everlasting principles of power politics.
The challenging aspect, however, is the limited influence these leaders can exert against societal inclinations. The momentous changes hailed by leaders such as Scholz may not resonate with the general populace. Quoting a remark by an erstwhile European leader, once removed from its original context, “We all comprehend the required action, but the dilemma is retaining our positions after carrying out those actions.” – Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2024