Congress granted $61 billion in much-needed US defence aid to Ukraine nearly a week ago, a development met with nonchalance by Russia. The Russian camp expressed confidence that even high-level Western arms couldn’t shift the balance of power on the frontline.
According to individuals that have personal familiarity with him, President Vladimir Putin’s confidence has been growing within the past few months. This confidence is much more prevalent than it has been at any point since the time he ordered Ukraine’s invasion two years earlier. It will be interesting to see if the influx of military aid to Ukraine will impact his demeanour.
As Ukraine’s Western aid started dwindling and it faced difficulties in replacing its weary troops, Russia capitalised on its superior military and people power, achieving slow but steady progress across the battle line.
Top-ranking Ukrainian intelligence officers characterise Russia’s present attacks on critical frontline areas, and missile and drone strikes on Kharkiv and other cities of importance, as an attempt to debilitate the battlefield ahead of a greater offensive action. They predict that Russia will initiate a major offensive towards the end of May or beginning of June.
However, one Western official voiced skepticism about Russia’s capabilities, suggesting that even if they achieved some tactical successes on the frontline, their army remains burdened with outdated equipment and poorly trained soldiers, making them incapable of taking over Ukraine outright.
With the expected arrival of US aid, Ukraine stands a chance to expose the deficiencies in Russia’s tactics, which rely heavily on substandard ammunition and a large, yet inadequately trained force, Western defence officials and experts claim.
Echoing similar sentiments, one official highlighted that Russia, back in February 2022, was in possession of a superior trained and equipped military force, pointing to Russia’s initial infiltration and eventual defeat in northern Ukraine. They voiced doubts about any improvement in its military since then.
Since its failure to execute a swift and successful military campaign, Russia has shifted its strategy to attempt to wear out Ukraine by favouring volume over value on the battlefield. Notably, as reported by Dara Massicot from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Russia fires five shells to each retaliating one from Ukraine – a ratio that is even greater in some critical points along the line of contact.
Massicot stated that while the assistance provided may not negate Russia’s superiorities this year, it may empower the Ukrainian forces to safeguard their locations with counteractive artillery attacks, potentially stalling or impeding Russia’s progression.
Finance on defence from Russia has hit an all-time high this year, with a spending of a staggering 10.8 trillion roubles (equivalent to €110 billion), which equates to six per cent of the nation’s total GDP. This boost has resulted in the country ramping up its weapon production, with manufacturing units operating continuously, as per insider reports.
Acquisition of components necessary for high-tech weaponry like drones, guided explosives, prowling munitions, and high-accuracy missiles has been obstructed due to western sanctions, compelling Russia to lean on more basic weaponry.
The head of Rostec, Sergei Chemezov, revealed in November of the previous year that Russia increased the production of artillery and multiple launch systems to 2.5 times its previous quantities, while some types of ammunition witnessed a whopping more than 60-fold increase in production.
Despite these staggering figures, the capital city Moscow’s incapacitation to convert this ignited power into a substantial advantage reveals itself, with insiders suggesting that only advancement of weaponry could achieve this.
Acquisition of high-tech warfare equipment components has been stifened by western imposed restrictions, forcing Russia towards more traditional weapons which can be mass-produced with less difficulty. Ruslan Pukhov, who is the head of the Moscow-based defence think-tank, Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, made a statement on this.
Pukhov stated, “The battlefield’s most decisive systems in Ukraine are explicitly influenced by the sanctions. This requires leaders at all levels to manifest creative thinking and cognize the primary trends and expected outcomes of the war.”
Despite Russia’s larger weaponry stock, it doesn’t possess a radical lead over Ukraine concerning artillery and ammunition, according to him. He added that those fighting on the Russian side do not perceive any such advantage.
Instead, high-destruction glide bombs and modernised Soviet weaponry are being brought into action by the Kremlin, along with troops being deployed using motorcycles and off-road vehicles. Massicot succinctly concluded, “if it’s effective, it’s effective – irrespective of it being low-tech or not.”
According to Pavel Luzin, a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, in Washington, the massive rate of fire Russia subjected Ukraine to in the early stages of warfare couldn’t be sustained. Before the onset of Autumn in 2022, Russia was launching up to 60,000 shells a day, a number that’s since decreased to around 10,000 daily, including some supplied from North Korea and Iran.
This fall in shelling rate is indicative of the overstretching Russia’s supply chain is experiencing, even with its high manufacturing capacities, potentially slowing their overall advancement. To maintain their current firing rate, Russia would have to manufacture 3.6 million shells every year, as stated in a recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
However, their defence division admitted that at its peak, it only creates about half of the 4 million 152mm-calibre shells and 1.6 million 122mm-calibre shells they estimated were necessary to hold the line. The rapid rate of shelling is also degrading their artillery more quickly than new weapons can be generated, necessitating Soviet-era barrel replacements.
The vast manpower Russia has drawn upon significantly overshadows US aid and Ukrainian troops and official’s current capacity. NATO’s supreme allied commander for Europe, Christopher Cavoli, informed a Senate armed services committee hearing in April that Russia was enlisting around 30,000 soldiers monthly, boosting forces from 360,000 to 470,000 in a year.
Russia’s mercantilist strategy allows for easier recruitment of volunteers, enticed by financial gain, helping mitigate extensive mobilisation that led hundreds of thousands to flee the country in Autumn 2022. Salaries beginning at 200,000 roubles (€2,000), five times the average wage in certain impoverished regions, with bonuses ranging from 300,000 to a million roubles, are being offered to encourage enlistment, as per a report from Estonia’s foreign intelligence agency.
Incentives such as additional bonuses for battlefield achievements and injuries, as well as sizable sums given to families in the event of death in service, could encourage soldiers to join the Russian army. Given that an estimated 315,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded in the war, according to Cavoli, there’s an increasing necessity to recruit additional forces.
Russia’s commercial tactic allows it to attract enough individuals who find the financial benefits of combat appealing, without resorting to mass mobilisation. This strategy saved the exodus of hundreds or even thousands of men from the country in late 2022.
For Luzin from the Centre for European Policy Analysis, Russia’s current strategy relies heavily on what he terms ‘buying blood’ from Russia’s working class. Yet, Putin would have to initiate another phase of mass mobilisation if a summer offensive is planned, according to Massicot.
Anticipated campaigns in areas like Kharkiv or the more challenging southern Ukraine would necessitate a significantly large army, likely in the range of 100,000, along with auxiliary requirements such as equipment, Massicot added.
No matter how many men Russia drafts, sheer quantities won’t make up for their lack of military training, stressed Luzin. He pondered audibly on who would assume control of the mobilised forces, asking “We often discuss the mobilisation, but where are the necessary commanding officers – the commanders, sergeants, and lieutenants?” – Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2024.