The extent to which one has to tilt towards the right-wing in politics before getting tagged as an extremist or “far right” has long been a hot issue of debate. A substantial number of political analysts, mostly conservatives, have raised doubts if labels like “racist”, “fascist”, and the likes, suggesting extreme viewpoints, are being used too recklessly to refer to certain individuals’ views. They query how best to differentiate extreme racists from those labelled as such, like Donald Trump or Tucker Carlson, as mentioned in the American Conservative magazine.
Confusion further ensued as Trump himself complicated the discourse by calling black prosecutors in his criminal trials “racists” and promising to throw out fascists if re-elected the US president. This creates a question: Considering the lack of agreed interpretation, do these controversial phrases retain any meaning? Should we rather do away with these terms in public discourse?
Nat Hansen, a philosopher of language, and his colleagues from Europe and the US, are currently scrutinising these issues. Their focus includes investigating the frequency of these terms in public discussions as well as their potential evolution or shifts in meaning over time or between age groups.
The concept of “conceptual inflation”, the concern of which is that frequent usage of contentious terms like “racist” might lessen its severity, is another issue up for inspection in their study. Preliminary deductions from their surveys show some variance in usage between older people and those under 30, but make clear that universally, being called a “racist” is considered a severe accusation.
Hansen considers this as a step towards addressing the concern of diminution of seriousness associated with the term “racist” and asserts it still carries a robust moral weight.
Hansen has noted a potential hazard with the heightened use of the term “racist”, suggesting it hinders rather than enhances a discourse because the accusation carries a distinct force. This is often referred to as playing the “racism card”, an act that can stop a conversation dead in its tracks. However, Hansen is doubtful that limiting the use of “racist” would contribute to a better level of communication. Rather, he believes in detailing the exact aspects in a statement or political position which are deemed racist.
Hansen categorises “racist” as a gradable adjective just like “dirty” or “ill”, allowing us to indicate the severity or intensity of the adjective. He points out that it’s possible to modulate the severity of this term according to the context – say, it could range from ‘mildly racist’ to ‘intensely racist’ or ‘racist in an elderly person’s manner’, not that it’s borne out of hate.
Hansen also warns about tactics of diversion through misuse of language. In place of tackling substantial political issues or intricate on-the-ground problems which are challenging to resolve, the discussion can shift to an unwarranted focus on language. This might manifest itself in multiple ways. For instance, a person on the left might accuse their political competitor of being racist to shutdown valid exchanges on migration rules. Conversely, a right-wing individual who is charged of harbouring racist beliefs might discard any dialogue unless the allegation is revoked.
It’s essential, as per Hansen, to allow multiple readings of one word and maintain a mindfulness about whether the chosen terminology is appropriate or not. He advocates becoming ‘thoughtful communicators’.
He also implies that having one standard definition of “racist” might simplify things. However, hoping for a single definition seems futile for two reasons. Firstly, the interpretation of words has always been in a flux and secondly, Hansen refers to a recent study showing distinct uses of the term “gay” among different generations. Older folks might use it in a more cheerful sense, middle-aged people in reference to homosexuality, while younger people might use it in a more derogative way, indicating the continuous evolution of language.
Secondly, the nature of political discourse implies that some ideas are, in the words of the Scottish academic Walter Bryce Gallie, “essentially contested”. For instance, the term “democracy” offers varied interpretations. Do the United States or Hungary qualify as a democracy? Even more controversial is the use of the term in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The government in North Korea clings to the label that engenders a positive emotional response, explains Hansen, despite the discrepancy in the common usage of the term.
Hence, a ceaseless struggle is inevitable regarding the ownership and the right to employ such concepts. This stems from their potent emotional impact. It’s an impracticable task to concretely determine what exactly racism or democracy denotes, as their meanings are constantly challenged due to their value as crucial tools in argumentation.