In the face of a potential full-scale war in the Middle East since the uprising of disagreement between Israel and Hamas in the previous October, tensions soared once more about a week ago. Israel executed multiple proactive assaults in South Lebanon, leading to the obliteration of an array of Hizbullah’s rocket launchers, claiming three lives in the process.
Despite Israel’s provocations, Hizbullah vowed it had unleashed over 300 rockets and drones targeting 11 Israeli military units. This act was a response to the execution of Fuad Shukr, a high-ranking Hizbullah commander, which took place in Beirut on July 30th. Regardless of the apprehensions about a possible emergence of a full-blown war, neither party is keen on igniting an escalation at present.
Hizbullah’s leadership has openly indicated that a full-fledged war with Israel does not align with their interests. Subsequent to the Israeli attack a week ago, the faction’s chief, Hassan Nasrallah, addressed a bunch of scholars explaining that retaliation doesn’t exclusively imply wielding weapons. Nasrallah suggested that it implies critical thinking, careful articulation, precise understanding, and accurate targeting. The leader also announced on television that they hit an Israeli base housing the army’s intelligence division, rejecting any intentions of attacking Tel Aviv– an act that would undoubtedly rake up the conflict.
Hizbullah’s guarded stance is informed by their awareness of the significant impact a full-scale war against Israel would have. The severe economic turmoil and political void Lebanon has been sinking into and the domestic pressure on the militant group adds to the reasons to resist further worsening the country’s predicament.
From Israel’s viewpoint, a broader conflict is equally unintelligent. Given that Israeli forces are already entangled in the Gaza conflict, no energy remains to extend the military’s capabilities for another front.
Despite the uncertainty surrounding Iran’s response to the murder of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July, it is clear their leadership is dedicated to seeking revenge. On August 27th, Iran’s Deputy Defence Minister, Hojatollah Qureishi, alluded to an unpredictable reprisal, while the Iranian envoy to Lebanon asserted there would certainly be retribution against Israel.
Given the above, it is understandable why US National Security Advisor John Kirby stated that Iran had positioned itself for a possible assault on Israel. Kirby reaffirmed the US’s adherence to its defensive position in the region, promising to safeguard Israel and defend American troops and infrastructure as long as required.
Although the Iranian leadership is hesitant about escalating the situation into a broader conflict, the murder of Haniyeh in Tehran is undeniably a distinct affront. There is also an awareness of the need to avoid backlash from American forces in their response. The US has noticeably increased its regional presence following Haniyeh’s assassination, deploying additional military resources to the Middle East.
Iran’s reluctance to escalate the situation was further emphasised when their supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, promoted engagement with Iran’s adversary – the USA, implying the potential reopening negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme. The newly elected reformist President of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian dedicated himself to tackling the sanctions that were reimposed by then US President Donald Trump in 2018 following America’s withdrawal from the 2015 Nuclear deal.
Iran and Hizbullah argue the necessity of a measured approach to Israel’s actions to enable smooth negotiations on a truce in Gaza and the freeing of remaining Israeli captives held by Hamas. Nonetheless, despite numerous optimistic communications from US officials, negotiations seem to have hit a dead-end, and a resolution appears elusive.
A recent proposition builds upon an initial plan suggested by US president Joe Biden in May. This initial plan included a short-term ceasefire, a hostage release in return for Palestinians held back by Israel, and the subsequent return of Palestinians removed from northern Gaza. It also suggested Israel’s military exit from populated zones in Gaza. A prolonged ceasefire would be the second phase, with Gaza’s reconstruction spread out over several years in the third phase.
The bone of contention in the discussions is primarily centred on the Israeli military’s potential exit from Gaza. Talks have concentrated on a pair of zones under the Israeli military’s control – the Philadelphi corridor, situated between Egypt and Gaza, and the Netzarim corridor, a 6km land strip separating northern from southern Gaza, set up by the Israeli military amidst the on-going conflict.
Israeli Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, maintains that Israel will not pull out from either zone, a stance that has been received with strong disapproval from Hamas. It’s understood that the Israeli defence establishment, which includes Mossad, Shin Bet, and the IDF, is open to withdrawing from the Egyptian border and Netzarim. Despite this, Netanyahu is pushing for a more robust stance in the negotiating, sparking cynicism about his intentions to secure a deal.
His position is reliant on right-wing ministers who aspire to see Gaza occupied again by Israel and have expressed readiness to topple the government if Netanyahu concedes too much. Consequently, this might lead to elections from which Netanyahu could potentially emerge as a loser and be subjected to trial for corruption allegations. His accountability concerning security issues preceding the October 7th incidents might also be demanded sooner.
The short-term positioning of Netanyahu in the discussions appears to have been bolstered by recent reports of the deaths of six Israeli captives, the bodies of whom were returned by the IDF last Saturday. The incident led him to make declarative statements regarding the killers’ lack of an interest in peace.
Given the protracted nature of the Gaza conflict, combined with the advent of regional elements like Hizbullah and Iran, escalations – whether intentional or inadvertent – pose a considerable threat to the region.
Dr Vincent Durac, a Middle East politics lecturer at UCD’s school of politics and international relations, offers these insights.