Michael McGrath’s Unwanted Justice Role

The appointment of Michael McGrath to oversee democracy, justice and the rule of law by Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, reflects the declining status of Ireland within Brussels. A misguided belief that this is only a mere transference in roles, particularly for a past finance minister longing for an economic brief, and not a surefire path towards clashes with countries like Slovakia and Hungary cannot be ignored since the position of justice is one seldom desired.

Truthfully, in the span of ten years Ireland has traded overseeing agriculture and rural development – which commands a third of the EU budget – for the contentious task of reining in aspiring European tyrants behind the guise of a ‘democracy shield’; taking a detour through the realms of trade and financial services.

Recent focus will undeniably be on the relentless obliviousness of Fianna Fáil to European relations as evidenced by voting against the reappointment of von der Leyen or the Irish government’s defiance to Brussels’ demand to propose both a male and female nominee. Yet these are merely the newest instances of Ireland’s disconnection from the actualities of the EU.

Ireland’s outlook in the EU is not optimistic. It is increasingly challenging to counteract the opinion widely held in Brussels, predominantly associating Ireland with features such as quasi-corporate tax evasion, laxity on safety and defence, implementing digital and data protection laws less effectively than demanded by the EU and continuously sermonising about financial discipline while simultaneously disregarding its fiscal regulations. Add to this, being a largely English-speaking economy with no comprehensive plan for the transition of its older workforce within European institutions, Ireland’s image in the EU continues to deteriorate.

Reflecting upon Ireland’s recent unsuccessful bid to become the home of the new EU Anti-Money Laundering Authority puts into light some of the incongruities of the nation’s stance. At the time, finance minister Michael McGrath presented Dublin as an exceptional choice, citing Ireland’s excellent record in administration, governance, and it’s distinctive role as a major common-law jurisdiction within the EU. Paradoxically, these exact traits elicited chuckles from EU quarters, getting them to believe Ireland would never host AMLA – an accurate prediction as Frankfurt was eventually chosen.

Ireland had to be bailed out in 2010 due to its dysfunctional banking regulations and even in 2024, the nation remains a hot spot for corporations seeking tax benefits. It would be logical to assume that Paris and Berlin would instinctively rule out creating any new EU financial body in Ireland – more so one which would be safeguarding the EU banking system’s integrity.

Rather than seizing the opportunity left by Brexit, Ireland has defaulted back to its familiar role of benign humanitarian. This scenario underscores not just Dublin’s increasing detachment from Brussels’ ground realities, but also a burgeoning egotism rooted in Ireland’s public policy. This is exemplified in a belief that somehow Ireland’s economic model outshines those of mainland Europe based on a mistaken presumption of Ireland being one of the EU’s wealthiest members.

The country’s interactions with Brussels are often laced with a superior “we-know-it-all” demeanour, last observed during the Celtic Tiger phase, probably rekindled now with Brexit. This attitude is rather unbecoming of Ireland’s historical and self image. In reality, Ireland’s credibility in Brussels has been shaky, gradually decreasing over the last two decades.

A slew of unsuccessful referendums on EU treaties, a stubborn unwillingness to apply EU data protection rules properly, novel taxation strategies for US corporations, the imprudent decision to let go a high-ranking EU trade commissioner (seen as a reckless political move in Brussels), along with an increasing reliance on a handful of US tech and pharma giants – do not collectively portray a picture of a reliable and proactive advocate of stronger European integration.

Instead, it reflects the opportunistic stance of a country that still places its central economic ties with the United States (through corporate taxation) and the United Kingdom (through the Common Travel Area) above broader European agendas. Dublin lacks a cohesive blueprint for its desired role in the EU’s future, and struggles to align its diverse range of interests with an increasingly centralized, unified EU, built on amplified defence expenditure, relaxed competition regulations, and substantially larger EU-level levies. Despite now being a major net contributor to the EU budget, Ireland still seems uncertain about which type of Europe would best cater to its long-standing interests. Instead of seizing the opportunity created by Brexit to transform into an advocate for a more streamlined, powerful, single market-centric EU, Ireland has reverted to its conventional role of benign humanitarian.

In the official AMLA application, Ireland was showcased as a diverse, highly-educated nation, featuring classic images of the Powerscourt Waterfall and the Ha’penny Bridge. It was optimistically stated that the ambition behind the application was to intensify the nation’s dedication to Europe and to uphold and project the Union’s values on a global platform. Regrettably, two months following the competition loss, the Irish Government received a letter from the European Commission. This formal notice initiated an infringement procedure against Ireland for improper transposition of existing EU anti-money laundering directives into Irish law.

In Brussels, we’re the subject of jest.

Dr Eoin Drea is a senior researcher at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies in Brussels, the research institution of the European People’s Party.

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