Dark times now prevails where we live. War is widespread in Europe, with Ukrainian cities being brought down to rubble. Critiques of the Kremlin administration are either being imprisoned or executed. From a ‘supervised democracy’, Russia has turned into a ‘fear-ruled dictatorship’. Ukrainian women and children are primarily seeking refuge in the West, pursuing safety from a battle that has decimated their habitats, while young Russian men are escaping towards the East; others, however, have relocated to the West to operationalize an exiled media counter-offensive.
Those below the ages of 40 or even 50, scarcely recall periods when hopefulness and positivity were the prevailing sentiments. Such were the radiant days when Mikhail Gorbachev proposed his dream of a ‘novel European abode’ reaching from Vladivostok to Lisbon in 1989, during a discourse at the Council of Europe. This served as his declaration that the Cold War was over.
One wonders, how did it all fall apart? Richard Sakwa, professor emeritus of Russian and European politics at Kent University, gives a comprehensive argument in The Lost Peace about how the ‘Political West’ missed its chance to establish a stable international system, and the consequential deliberate undermining by ‘Neo-conservatives and Liberal Interventionists’ to further American domination. This self-perceived victorious bloc assumed their Cold War triumph gave them the prerogative to dictate their ideas on the defeated.
From my experience, the conclusion of the Cold War was interpreted quite differently by numerous Russian citizens as well as those across the former USSR. This was perceived as relief from subjugation fused with an innocent expectation that the Western paradise would now extend its economic prosperity to those who battled against repression for years.
The reality that unfolded for ordinary Russians was diametrically opposite to their anticipations. Sakwa contends that President Clinton passed the baton for handling Russia to Vice President Al Gore, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, and this team introduced economic reforms which set in motion a catastrophic financial crisis.
I was present during this crisis of the 1990s. From the safe haven of my Moscow dwelling in an exclusive foreign residential area, I observed the decline of dignified Russians to destitute. I witnessed firsthand, the daily struggle of decently dressed citizens- primarily middle-aged women- scouring for food in our garbage disposal.
The US wasn’t the only player in the economic catastrophe. Russian economists, deriving from an elite communist background, pursued this policy with more fanaticism than any American. Their privileged origins ensured their personal comfort was maintained whilst others fell into poverty. Meanwhile, Russian entrepreneurs capitalized on these circumstances, amassing enormous wealth while the majority suffered. This gave rise to an oligarchic class. Additionally, formerly hidden organised crime surfaced and waged its brutal wars in plain sight. The horrendous sight of crows feeding on human remains in a Moscow cemetery, the result of a bomb from a rival faction, remains etched in memory.
These experiences tainted the image of the West for many Russians, leading to the term “Democrat” being associated with disdain. The political top brass became discontented for a host of other reasons. Sakwa notes many, but it was Nato’s possible absorption of Ukraine and its expansion towards Russian territory that stirred up the most havoc.
Nato, justifying its stance, highlighted that there was no agreement stopping its augmentation and independent nations possessed the right to determine their security measures. Sakwa conveys that there were countless promises from western seniors such as Helmut Kohl, François Mitterand, and Margaret Thatcher that this intensification wouldn’t occur. Nevertheless, assurances don’t hold legal weight and whilst Gorbachev may have been credulous to trust them, he, along with the entire Russian leadership, felt a sense of treachery.
Many in the West perceived that Russia’s adjacent states aims and anxieties could be soothed by means other than joining Nato. This ideology led to a considerable number of American leaders opposing the expansion. This included senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Sam Nunn, anti-Soviet historian Richard Pipes, ambassador to Moscow William Burns who later ascended to the top of the CIA, and acclaimed US Sovietologist George Kennan. Kennan judiciously cautioned that Russia would inevitably retaliate.
Jack Matlock, an erstwhile U.S. ambassador, precisely stated that the choice to broaden NATO’s presence eastwards, instead of engaging Russia in a collaborative framework for European security, effectively weakened the potential for democracy in Russia. Matlock, at the time of his comment, certainly could not have anticipated the extent to which Russia would diverge from democratic norms, human rights, and legal governance under Vladimir Putin’s reign.