Around two decades ago, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had an experience in which he believed he was the conduit of divine communication. Khamenei shared this unique spiritual encounter during a casual gathering with some 20 commanders of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, specifying it happened during a conversation post a group prayer.
It has been whispered amongst political circles that such a revelation is unusual, even for a nation as devout as Iran, sparking hushed debates about Khamenei’s possible divine connection. However, no individual had the audacity to confront him over this claim openly. This incident did, nevertheless, emphasise Khamenei’s remarkable religious influence as the paramount spiritual and political authority within the Islamic republic for over 30 years.
One of Ayatollah Khamenei’s relatives emphasises his firm belief that his successful steering past domestic and international adversaries throughout his leadership tenure was due to divine favour and spiritual guidance. Khamenei is seen by his supporters as being blessed by God to rule, setting him apart due to his persistent divine connection.
Currently 85 years old, Ayatollah Khamenei’s earthly tenure is seemingly nearing its conclusion, spotlighting the issue of who will take his place. The recently elected Assembly of Experts, a council of roughly 90 senior clerics with the responsibility of electing a new supreme leader, might find themselves selecting the new leader during their eight-year term.
Khamenei’s successor will become the ultimate authority on issues covering domestic and foreign policies and defence in Iran, moulding not just the nation’s political Islam but also deciding the regime’s future. This reality was highlighted during the Israel-Hamas war and its regional implications, with the supreme leader’s authority evident in Iran’s exceptional direct strike on Israeli targets a month ago.
The determination concerning leadership transition has been meticulously planned, and not left to fate. The powerful individuals within the regime made certain that the majority of the membership within the Assembly of Experts consisted of staunch conservatives rather than moderate or reformative folks. This strategy forms part of a long-term plan initiated several years ago to orchestrate a predictable shift in power to ensure the regime’s continuity.
However, there is currently no sole candidate groomed to step into Khamenei’s role and open dialogue on the subject is deemed inappropriate. As one high-ranking politician advocating reform articulated, “Every intimate political circle is abuzz with conversations on succession, but no single figure fits the mould for the role.”
The impending transition, when it finally happens, signifies a potential existential crisis for the regime, possibly revealing the authentic power struggles at play. It is expected that the Revolutionary Guards will strive to increase control over state matters, curbing the influence of other key political and religious factions that have been the bedrock of the republic since the Islamic revolution in 1979. It is also observed that the public opposition that previously rattled the regime in 2022 might resurface.
The idea of possessing supreme power in the country was masterminded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the orchestrator of the 1979 Islamic revolution, which brought the millennia-long reign of monarchs to an end.
Following his demise in 1989, the Assembly of Experts instantly endorsed Khamenei as his successor, despite objections from senior clergymen who felt he was not experienced enough for the role.
The supreme leader’s primary foreign policy, couched in the slogan “no war, no direct negotiations” with the US, encourages continual antagonism towards the US and Israel. He seeks to strengthen Iran’s military clout in the Middle East via allied forces.
Recent actions by Khamenei include his approval of a large-scale drone and missile attack on Israel in retaliation for their purported strike on Iran’s consulate in Syria. This was perceived by observers as an indication of his readiness to take strategic risks, portraying himself as a leader who isn’t afraid to clash with Israel and risk potential US interference.
Despite this, Khamenei’s primary concern is the protection of the republic. Iran’s actions in executing these attacks were deliberate, reducing casualties to avoid a full-scale war. Iran prudently ignored Israel’s speculated limited counterattack.
In domestic affairs, Khamenei has a black-and-white view of political parties. Either they uphold the principles of the 1979 revolution or they don’t. He doesn’t divide them into traditional categories such as hardliners and reformists. He has, over the past twenty years, subtly permitted traditionalists to side-line pro-reform factions, allowing hardliners to gain control over the entire state apparatus.
Observers note that there is less and less room for those whose views diverge from the highest leadership and their inner circle. Remaining politically relevant seemingly requires unflinching adherence to the prescribed philosophical guidelines.
A former official from the reform movement stated, “The Islamic Republic no longer permits influential personas. It instead shows preference towards those displaying unwavering loyalty to the state’s ideology and vehemently echoing hardline rhetoric, regardless of their political standing.” They noted that the extreme political environment being created presents a distinct advantage to the unknown powers-that-be.
This was evident in the most recent election for the Assembly of Experts. This saw Iranians voting to determine who would occupy the 88 seats reserved for senior clerics. Renowned pro-reform figures either abstained or faced bans. The middle-of-the-road ex-president, Hassan Rouhani was not allowed to run for re-election for a seat he’d held since 1999. This decision was made by a constitutional body that reports exclusively to the supreme leadership.
Instead, the “super-revolutionaries” – hardliners calling for heightened domestic restrictions and a more confrontational approach with the West – took on the old-guard hardliners. They won a considerable number of seats in Tehran giving them a significant platform from which to carve out a new trajectory.
Such power shifts, analysts suggest, are all part of a careful strategy for a power handover. The primary objective is to ensure the next leader continues on the predestined path, remaining true to Khamenei’s revered legacy.
According to a reserved correspondent, “Mr. Khamenei is a dutiful ‘mujahid’ (fighter) in every sense of the term. He will resist anyone he perceives as straying from the revolutionary track or attempting to heal relations with the US.”
Although the formal task of selecting the next leader falls to the Assembly of Experts, there is skepticism as to whether such a significant choice will be left entirely up to an aging group of high-ranking clerics.
While other organisations such as the government, judiciary, and parliament are predicted to hold some sway, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is slated to be the most influential. As the dominant institution, the IRGC’s power has escalated over the past ten years, with perceptions of it functioning as more than just a protective force for Khamenei, but also the driving factor behind the regime’s military and economic focal points.
Staffed by approximately 120,000 personnel and backed by a large constituency of voluntary Iranian forces, the IRGC commands a far-reaching network in the Middle East termed the “Axis of Resistance”. It has supplied the likes of Lebanon’s Hizbullah, Yemen’s Houthi militants, Iraqi Shia fighters, and Palestinian factions such as Hamas with both training and equipment.
Surprisingly, the 2020 US assassination of Qassem Soleimani, their key commander for foreign operations, did not alter the trajectory of the elite force’s increasing influence. This inward and outward growth has led international observers to regard them as a “state within a state”, achieving a concentration of power at the expense of time-honoured institutions such as the clergy.
They are aware, however, that religious validation for the republic’s political framework and its leaders stems primarily from the clerical institution, and are therefore cautious. Tensions surfacing is deemed unlikely by analysts.
An analyst explained, ” While the IRGC will not directly meddle in the succession process, they will serve as the main advisory to the assembly. But the IRGC and the clergy will not face off against each other”. There is minimal expectation of significant figures within the next Assembly of Experts challenging the IRGC’s dominance. “President Ebrahim Raisi will likely be the standout figure in the forthcoming assembly, but even his influence is negligible,” a former official explained. “It’s too early to say whether the Revolutionary Guards will continue on their present course or steer the nation towards a notable shift.”
Speculation in private circles has highlighted two potential successors for the supreme leadership role.
Raisi is the leading figure in the republic’s day-to-day affairs, and he’s recognised for his unwavering allegiance to Khamenei, which has seen him avoid any clash with the guards, especially during the recent Hamas-Israel conflict. In Iranian political discussions, the lens through which this Raisi-Khamenei dynamic is interpreted varies between perceived weakness and strength. Raisi’s victory in the 2021 election saw many speculating on his future as Khamenei’s chosen successor, as other notable conservative and reformist candidates were barred from participation.
However, his near three-year term in office has seen little positive economic change, demonstrated by an inflation rate that exceeds 40%, a decline in the national currency, and failure to kick-start the dormant nuclear deal with world powers, despite mounting pressure from the business sector.
The idea is being put forward that his presidential role was a set-up by his competing hardliners, forcing him into the role at a moment when the country is struggling with a plethora of issues, which may hinder his rise to lead the nation.
Another likely successor to Khamenei is his son, Mojtaba. Mojtaba, now 54, has a low public profile yet has often been on the receiving end of protests since the controversial 2009 re-election of hardline president Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad. The protest crowd claimed that the vote was manipulated to block reformist candidate Mir-Hossein Moussavi, thus clearing the path for Mojtaba to follow in his father’s footsteps.
Significant slices of Khamenei’s inner circle, afraid of shifts that could alter their interests, are supporting Mojtaba, assuming his leadership would maintain the status quo. His proponents highlight his acquisitions of senior-ranking cleric status, displaying his ability to step into the highest position.
As an Iranian journalist with deep knowledge of the regime’s inner workings notes, there is concern for the future of a substantial network composed of business, politics and religious sectors, all tied to the supreme leader’s office, under a new regime. In their opinion, Mojtaba’s reign would be the most secure and appealing choice. The fear is that a leader like Raisi might form his own network, akin to what Khamenei did.
Though succession plans are being discreetly orchestrated by the senior leadership, a multitude of uncertain factors, including the force of the economy and the broader stability of the Middle East, have potential to disrupt these deliberations. Moreover, increasing dissension towards Iran’s leadership within the country is a significant factor.
The last few years have witnessed mounting public dissent. For instance, in 2019, protests against escalating fuel prices led to the loss of over 300 lives, as per Amnesty International’s data. Similarly, in late 2022, a wave of prolonged protests emerged following the police custody death of a 22-year-old female, Mahsa Amini, who allegedly breached mandatory Islamic hijab norms. The aftermath resulted in more than 300 deaths.
The killings of young protestors demanding a secular state has left an indelible impression on the nation. Contrarily, the establishment exhibited reluctance to back down, aside from occasionally ignoring women appearing in public without hijabs.
The reaction of Iran’s youth to a new leader imminently taking charge remains unpredictable. They generally harbour reformist views and perceive the core institutions of the republic as flawed and riddled with corruption. During the 2022 protests, their anger was directed primarily at Khamenei, the guardians, and the clerics, often resulting in open defiance marked by removing turbans in public.
Simultaneously, many Iranians expressed concerns about the guardians’ endorsement of regional militias at a time of economic crisis and stringent US sanctions, which are repercussions of those policies. On national TV, sociologist Mostafa Mehraeen stated that a significant part of the Iranian populace yearns for a normal life, free from the regime’s ideological interference.
He further noted an inherent “contradiction” in Iran’s constitution, which identifies itself as “God’s representative on Earth”, while also purporting to be a “democratic government” acknowledging citizens’ voting rights. “Citizens seek a prosperous life and refuse to be manipulated as pious victims of the system,” he added.
While it is estimated that several million people support the republic and have stakes in maintaining the status quo, the idea of an overarching leader dictating all life aspects seems obsolete for many educated young Iranians—unless that leader initiates profound reforms. Considering the two potential successors, however, such a scenario appears unlikely.
“We continue to harbour optimism that Khamenei, an intellectual who has consumed a plethora of books, novels, poetry and historical works, will commence much-needed reforms during his tenure,” asserts the advocate for political reform. “The existing trajectory is undoubtedly untenable and will bring even greater hazards after his demise.”
But an economical advisor suggests that there is no hint of any change to the existing situation as long as Khamenei lives. “A significant shift, whether it’s for better or worse, can only be expected when Khamenei passes away.”
At present, given the lack of a credible alternative either domestically or internationally, the political regime seems more intent than ever on reinforcing its domestic power, using measures such as the introduction of mandatory hijab for women and internet restrictions.
This includes jailing political and human rights activists and sometimes, executing protesters who have rebelled against the political structure in 2022 or earlier. These actions reinforce the government’s steadfastness towards maintaining its policies, regardless of consequences at home and abroad.
A relation of Khamenei explains that the ideology of the Islamic republic holds a sense of duty to protect Islam until Mahdi, the 12th Shia Muslim Imam who is in “Occultation” or obscured from sight, returns at an undisclosed time to bring fairness to the world.
“Believing in this notion, you truly feel invincible from threats, unless both domestic and international dangers become so pronounced that everyone is alerted,” he states. “Until such a time, Mr Khamenei and his successor will feel secure, comforted by the concept of sacred protection.” – Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2024.