Over the past week, the relationship between Iran and Israel underwent a significant transformation. There was an incursion on Israeli land by Iran and a subsequent presumed Israeli drone aggression on Isfahan in Iran, constituting a major breakthrough in the existing hostility pattern that have governed the two nations in recent years. Post the 1979 revolution which led to the overthrow of the pre-existing order in Iran and the birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran, opposition to Israel and its western allies, primarily the United States, has been a fundamental feature of Iran. Nevertheless, until these latest assaults, both parties engaged in an indirect war.
Iran rendered support to the Islamic Resistance Movement, namely Hamas, in Palestine, and Hizbullah in Lebanon on Israel’s northern boundary, whereas Israel implemented a chain of strikes aiming to derail Iran’s quest for nuclear proficiency. Israel has been widely suspected for years for targeting Iran’s nuclear project perceived as a potential threat, employing a spectrum of tactics from drone attacks and cyber onslaughts to confidential information theft and killing of crucial scientists, despite its refutations.
Moreover, Israel attempted to halt the influx of Iranian armaments to Hizbullah by intercepting weapon shipments midway or aiming at facilities harbouring weapons. Israel executed assaults on Syria to minimalize the amplification of Iranian influence there. However, post the Hamas-led violence in southern Israel on October 7th, a shift in Israeli approach was noted which entailed direct targeting of eminent personnel in Iran’s military. From last year’s December to this year’s March, several high-ranking officials from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps were assassinated. This surge of violence resulted in the airstrike in Damascus on April 1st, which resulted in the deaths of Mohammad Reza Zahedi and six others high-rank military commanders, thus inciting Iran’s attack on Israel last weekend.
Iran reacted to the bombing of its consulate as a direct violation on its land, thus justifying last weekend’s counter-attack. Besides, Iran’s assault can also be interpreted as a counteraction to allegations of inertia subsequent to former Israeli offensives, while also highlighting the frailty of the neighbouring Arab regimes reluctant to confront Israel head-on.
Recent Iranian assaults indicate a strategic progression from reliance on regional proxy groups, a tactic which allowed Iran to extend its influence without direct involvement in local clashes. This development seems to reflect the growing stronghold of hardliners within Tehran’s government structure. As of March this year, legislative elections in Iran reinforced conservative dominance and a strengthened hardline presence in the political arena, despite record-low voter participation.
However, Israel is not the sole regional power unsettled by Iran’s increased presence in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and allied nations underscore the part Iran plays in regional disputes, specifically in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and the Israel/Palestine conflict, by way of domestic proxy actors. The actual control Iran exerts over these proxies is often overstated. Though Iran’s influence over Hizbullah in Lebanon and various Iraqi militias is sizeable, its control over the Houthi movement in Yemen and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine is considerably reduced.
The statement by the UK’s Foreign Minister, David Cameron, asserting that “Iran is responsible for Hamas in Gaza, they are responsible for what is happening in Yemen, they are responsible for Hizbullah in Lebanon,” both magnifies Iran’s control over its “proxies” and contributes to its status within certain sectors of the public opinion in the region.
Regardless, it’s undeniable that Iran has established an ascendant position in the Middle East, particularly following the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq which displaced Saddam Hussein’s regime. This regime had previously involved itself in an eight-year war against Iran and its displacement led to the rise of powers friendly to Iran. Veteran US diplomat Richard Haass stated earlier that the Iraq War so skewed the balance of power towards Iran that “we…continue to pay a real price for the strategic blunder that was the Iraq War.”
The Iranian strikes on Israel have won approval from broad segments of the Middle Eastern population who openly criticise Arab governments for their harsh rhetoric on the Palestine issue, particularly the current state of Gaza, without taking substantial action. The recent revelation that Jordan intercepted Iranian drones aimed at Israel has sparked outrage both domestically and across the broader region.
Despite being touted as a warning missile attack, Iran’s military efficacy is being second-guessed following their failed show of force, which merely resulted in grievous harm to a seven-year old Arab Bedouin girl. The lacklustre outcome raises doubts about Iran’s ability to engage militarily with Israel or its significant ally, the United States. Iran’s restrained initial reaction to Israel’s most recent strikes also implies an intent to avoid heightening tensions further.
Furthermore, critics argue that the timing of the Iranian assault was ill-advised, serving only to consolidate support for Israel midst international criticism, particularly from key allies including the United Kingdom, Germany, and the U.S. The aftermath of the attack saw direct involvement from the US and UK military in collaboration with Israel.
Simultaneously, Arab nations seem to be reluctant to risk their ties with the U.S. for Iran’s cause. Reports suggest that key intelligence about Iran’s plans to target Israel was provided by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Contrarily, while Iraq didn’t interfere with the Iranian drones, they didn’t hinder the US forces shooting them down on their territory. As global focus shifts towards the evolving Iranian-Israeli conflict, the ongoing crisis in Palestine is slowly being overshadowed and forgotten.
The author, Dr. Vincent Durac, holds a teaching position in the field of Middle Eastern politics at the UCD School of Politics and International Relations.