The highly anticipated Operation Kenova inquiry has revealed that more lives may have ended, as opposed to being spared, due to the actions of the British Army’s chief undercover agent during the Northern Ireland Troubles. Northeast Reporter Seanín Graham provided details of this shocking result.
The Kenova inquiry, which took seven years to complete and cost £40 million, delved into the operations of a top double agent, popularly known as Stakeknife. Announced on Tuesday, the investigation’s comprehensive report implicated both the highly specialised British Army division and the Special Branch of RUC for their role in suppressing crucial information relating to their agents. This lack of disclosure resulted in severe infringement of laws, including murder, which could have been curtailed or investigated earlier.
Freddie Scappaticci, a high-ranking Belfast IRA member and believed to be Stakeknife, was the head of the notorious internal security unit (ISU), also referred to as the nutting squad. Nevertheless, his identity has not been confirmed in the report owing to the UK government’s stance of “neither confirm nor deny” (NCND) in matters involving sensitive intelligence.
Jon Boutcher, the existing Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) led the inquiry, describing the actions of the IRA as the “the most disgraceful and ungodly I have ever come across”. The massive 200-page report pertains to Stakeknife as synonymous with allegations of state misconduct. It also refutes numerous speculations and false narratives regarding his murderous activities that have surfaced over the years.
In analysing the files associated with Stakeknife, Boutcher approximated that the number of lives saved were not in the hundreds as touted, but ranged between high single to low double digits. He significantly noted that these numbers don’t account for the loss of life as a result of Stakeknife’s ongoing operations as an agent.
More so, Boutcher expressed the strong possibility that the activities of Stakeknife led to a greater number of lives lost than saved. Furthermore, there were undeniably instances when Stakeknife, left unchecked by his supervisors, breached the limits of his assignments, and engaged in activities that posed serious risks.
The frenzied allegations in the media and public sphere concerning Stakeknife has led to misperceptions about him within the security forces and in society at large. Some in the security services perceive him as more significant than he actually was, while others harbour fears that his actions were more harmful than reported. The reality, however, likely exists somewhere between these two polar opposites.
The assertion that Stakeknife’s intelligence saved countless lives seems to have its roots in the Force Research Unit (FRU) of the British Army—an organisation known for its recruitment and handling of informants. However, the report points out that these evaluations were based on uncertain and speculative internal measurements, not dissimilar to exaggerated claims about Brian Nelson, another agent. Despite this, many within the security services accepted these claims, which led to a somewhat skewed and defensive viewpoint of Stakeknife’s character.
The report emphasises the implausibility of these claims and advises caution when comparisons are made to Stakeknife being ‘the goose that laid the golden eggs’, an analogy rooted more in fable than fact. The report further details the substantial suffering experienced by the families of those alleged to be informants—often unjustly so. This resulted in enduring mental and physical health issues, premature deaths, self-harm incidents, and addiction among survivors.
Covering 101 incidents of murder and abduction, the report describes enormous human suffering. It points out the intimidation and despicable treatment endured by the families of the deceased, often forced to grieve in private due to the stigma attached to being seen as agents. The aftermath continues to significantly affect victims and families even today.
To honour those affected by the Troubles, the report suggests commemorating the longest day of the year, June 21. It further recommends formal apologies from both the UK government and the IRA to the victims.
The British government is being implored to show recognition and give an apology to bereaved families and surviving victims that suffered because of suspicions or accusations of being an informant. This recognises incidents where harm or murder could have been avoided, or where the offenders should have been subject to criminal justice but were not. The request suggests that full remorse should also be offered by the republican leadership for the abduction, torture, and murder of individuals suspected to be informants during the period of the Troubles by the Provisional IRA (PIRA).
Despite plentiful and actionable evidence, no convictions have been made for PIRA’s homicides. This lack of action may be attributed to the UK’s “neither confirm nor deny” policy, which restricts information from being disclosed to families. While some accused by PIRA honestly aided security forces, others were falsely accused.
Individuals who risked their lives to function as informants were often neglected by their recruiters, the security forces, and the government, rather than receiving the protection and justice they deserved. Jon Boutcher, the author of the report, condemned the IRA’s treatment of informants as “among the most disgraceful and wicked I’ve encountered.”
He further asserts that the security forces and the State are also accountable. Moreover, he highlights that the PIRA leadership greenlit and endorsed the brutal actions, with each act representing extreme cowardice. The enduring acceptance of these activities by senior republicans is disgraceful. The report concludes demanding that the republican leadership should acknowledge their wrongdoings and apologise to victims and their families.
According to a report referenced by Colm Keena, the Home Office regulations governing the conduct of informants participating in illegal activities during the Troubles in Northern Ireland were unfit for purpose and largely ignored. This neglected oversight fostered an environment where individuals were frequently subjected to torture or murder without any attempt to safeguard them or bring the culpable agents to justice. As a result, an unregulated, high-risk shadow operation erupted that operated outside official record keeping.
Discussions surrounding the legality of agent activities took place at cabinet level during the Troubles, although notable change did not occur until the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act was passed in 2000, bringing about proper regulation of agent handling.
The report also highlighted incidents where the Provisional IRA falsely accused its own members of espionage. Disputes within hierarchy, disagreements over PIRA’s illegal activities, or the desire to eliminate rivals in romantic entanglements, often triggered these accusations.
According to the findings of the Kenova investigation, several individuals accused of being informants or agents were not working for the security services as assumed, with the accusations mostly stemming from ulterior motives.
It was publicised by The Sunday Times in 1999 that there was a high-ranking informant within the ranks of the IRA. Freddie Scappaticci was eventually identified as this mole in May 2003. Despite rejecting these accusations and claiming only to have been part of the republican movement, he eventually fled to England under a pseudonym. In 2018, he was prosecuted for possession of child pornography and was given a suspended sentence, passing away the next year.
Scappaticci is believed to have taken up the role of an IRA intelligence officer in 1976. That same year, the British army formed the Force Research Unit (FRU) to manage IRA informers. In 1978, the Internal Security Unit (ISU), also known as the nutting squad, was established.
As documented in Richard O’Rawe’s book, ‘Stakeknife’s Dirty War’, published a year back, the Force Research Unit (FRU) was operational for fifteen years between 1980 and 1995. The unit had control over more than a hundred agents, with Scappaticci being one of them.
The main function of the FRU was to maintain internal discipline within the IRA and to expose informants. Scappaticci, who held the position of deputy to John Joe McGee, would persuade scared informants to disclose more information by promising them their life, but this was often not the case.
Freddie Scappaticci, born on January 12th, 1946, and a Belfast native, was the grandson of Bernardo Scappaticci and Marie Magliocco, Italian immigrants who moved to Belfast from central Italy in the late 19th century. Being one of the five children in the family and despite being not too tall, Scappaticci was notorious for his aggressive behaviour from a young age. Not long after the 1969 communal Belfast riots, he joined the ’69ers’, was arrested during the 1971 internment and served a four-year sentence.
Post his release in January 1974, he took up lucrative bricklaying work. Some believe his decision to become an informant was a consequence of a tax fraud he was involved in, the conviction for which could have led to an eight-year prison sentence.
An independent report unveiling the actions of the topmost IRA agent of the British Army during the Troubles will be made public on Friday morning. The report, which took seven years to complete and cost roughly £40 million (€46 million) focusses on the high-ranking double agent Stakeknife, believed to be Freddie Scappaticci, a former Belfast bricklayer and the “golden egg” of British military intelligence.
Operation Kenova, which will be presented in a Belfast hotel at 11am, examines potential failures by the Northern Ireland police to investigate up to 18 murders to safeguard Scappaticci. The inquiry considers Stakeknife’s actions within the Provisional IRA, including crimes like murder and torture and the role security services such as MI5 played.
Scappaticci, implicated in 18 killings, passed away the previous year at 77 years old. Because of a British government policy termed “neither confirm nor deny” (NCND) pertaining to delicate matters of intelligence, his identity will not be disclosed in the report.
Reputable sources from The Irish Times anticipate that the report will probably conclude that a number of lives may have been spared during the Troubles, on the assumption that intelligence would have been properly utilised by state military forces.
In February, the North’s Public Prosecution Service proclaimed that no legal action would be initiated against five retired British servicemen or the seven presumed IRA members who were examined as components of the inquiry. They cited lack of ample evidence to assure a fair chance of obtaining a conviction.
The report, consisting of around 200 pages as informed by the PA news agency, is anticipated to require atonement from both the UK government and the IRA towards the grieving families and the surviving victims.
Moreover, it could likely demand a re-evaluation of the UK’s policy of neither confirming nor denying profound intelligence-related matters.
Formerly, the Kenova investigation was guided by Jon Boutcher. However, Boutcher had to abandon his position to assume his duties as the chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).