When Saudi Arabia drastically reduced its oil production in the autumn of 2022, US President Joe Biden was incensed. In a CNN interview following the announcement, Biden made it clear that he believed the move may have serious ramifications, potentially leading to a hike in the cost of crude oil, particularly in light of the instability caused by Russia’s conflict in Ukraine.
Biden’s administration, caught off guard by the Saudi decision, viewed it as a direct insult. There were concerns within the administration that the increase in domestic fuel costs in relation to the upcoming midterm elections might be negatively influenced by the cut.
To Biden, this felt personal. He had heavily invested his political reputation into Saudi Arabia, having visited just three months prior to discuss matters with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, despite his prior refusal to interact with him.
The tensions ran high behind closed doors, with some US officials suspecting that the Saudis adamantly claimed their decision was grounded in market forces, had intentionally sabotaged them. The whole situation became a critical juncture following months of effort to mend the troubled US-Saudi relations. In response, Biden suggested another appraisal of the diplomatic ties.
Despite Biden’s warning of repercussions, the significant fallout never ensued. Instead of a serious setback, the incident turned out to be a mere roadblock in their collective bid to restore diplomatic relations.
After the episode, there is a noticeable improvement in the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia. In fact, the latter is transitioning from an outcast to becoming one of the key global allies of Washington.
Ironically, US officials observe that now it is Israel, not Saudi Arabia, that poses a hindrance to an unprecedented agreement which could revolutionize the Middle East. This arrangement would result in normal diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel.
While the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict makes such an agreement presently unfeasible, its realization would be momentous for both Biden and Prince Mohammed. It would give Biden a monumental foreign policy triumph and fulfill Prince Mohammed’s aspiration of a US-Saudi defence pact. US officials anticipate that such an arrangement could significantly contribute to resolving the Gaza crisis, with a high-ranking Biden administration official asserting that Saudi Arabia’s influence is vital for any resolution that the Israelis would genuinely consider.
Indeed, the stark pivot in attitude partially reflects the event-driven nature of Biden’s foreign policy, much like his predecessor Barack Obama. It shines a light on the perennial struggle of American leaders who find themselves increasingly involved in the volatile Middle East despite efforts to distance from it. This became more pronounced after the combat between Hamas and Israel, sparked by the group’s attack on October 7th.
Equally, this highlights the significance of Gulf energy to American internal politics. Even with reduced dependency on oil imports, the US still feels the impact of Middle Eastern affairs on worldwide oil prices.
At heart, however, lies the pragmatic recognition in the US capital that Saudi Arabia holds great geopolitical importance. This led to worries that should they neglect their ties with Riyadh, the traditional US ally may fall more under China and Russia’s influence.
Jon Alterman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggests, “the manner to prevent Russia or China from aligning with Saudi Arabia is maintaining a relationship with the Saudis.”
The case for mending relations is further strengthened by the point that the US can’t abandon the Middle Eastern region to China. This point is continuously sparingly reminded of by the Saudis.
Over the years, the relationship between the US and Saudi has seen its share of ups and downs. However, it saw significant improvement under Donald Trump who succeeded Obama and opted for a more practical relationship with Riyadh.
His first foreign trip was to the kingdom and it included signing billion-dollar arms deals. Trump labelled them a crucial ally to counter Iran in 2018, a few weeks post the brutal assassination of the American-based journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi agents in Turkey.
Biden, however, took a different approach. He had pledged during his campaign run to reevaluate ties with the globe’s leading oil exporter and to ensure that Riyadh faced consequences for Khashoggi’s murder. This was alongside accusations against the kingdom of child killings in relation to Saudi Arabia’s ongoing war in Yemen.
Once assuming power, his strong words started to materialise into actions. Merely a week following his induction, he halted the sales of aggressive weaponry to the monarchy. A few weeks later, a secret intelligence dossier was released by Biden, that claimed Prince Mohammed, the monarchy’s virtual ruler, sanctioned a mission to “capture or kill” Khashoggi, a charge Riyadh deflected as a “rogue operation”.
However, under the surface, communication channels remained active. Brett McGurk, a seasoned veteran of past administrations and currently the White House’s key Middle East advisor, paid an early visit to the monarchy in an attempt to subtly reassure the Saudi’s that relations would start improving in the coming months.
Saudi Arabia also made gestures that was seen by Washington as an attempt to win over the new President. Prior to Biden’s inauguration, Saudi Arabia ended a regional embargo on Qatar, which had lasted over three years, fostering a shift in regional sentiment towards easing tensions between rival Middle Eastern powers. A leading Saudi activist, Loujaine al-Hathoul, was also released by Riyadh in February 2021.
Yet, the relation was still tense when Biden sent his national security advisor Jake Sullivan to the monarchy in September that year. There were preliminary talks about a possible meeting between Biden and Prince Mohammed at the G20 summit in Rome the following month. However, these plans fell apart when the Crown Prince decided not to personally attend the summit.
Eventually it was Vladimir Putin who became the decisive factor. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine that pushed energy prices to their highest levels in years and the fear amongst US officials that Riyadh, who had been collaborating with Moscow on oil production since 2016, might align with Russia’s president.
“The Biden administration’s perception of Saudi Arabia understandably shifted from a troublesome ally to a highly desired swing state due to the power struggles with China and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” observes Karim Sadjadpour, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment.
In the administration, there was resistance from many, including the state department, against increased collaboration with Prince Mohammed. But in the end, it was those who argued for practicality over moral indignation who carried the day.
In January 2022, weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Biden sent his delegates McGurk and Hochstein, two significant figures in his administration, to Saudi Arabia. Hochstein, as the chief energy advisor, possesses expertise in the oil and gas industry. Their visits to the kingdom became regular thereon.
Gradually, as ties appeared to be improving, the US projected the concept of a unified agreement involving Saudi Arabia and Israel normalisation of relations. The aegis to this agreement was a similarity to the defence pact the US holds with Japan, whilst promising assistance with Saudi Arabia’s emerging civilian nuclear programme, offering security assurance to the kingdom, something it felt was lacking from the US.
Conversations around a potential visit by Biden to Saudi Arabia also emerged, despite underlying uncertainties within some factions of his administration. The supporting argument for such outreach became stronger when in April 2022, Riyadh adhered to a truce with Houthi rebels in Yemen, facilitated by the UN.
By July, and within weeks of an Opec+ agreement to mildly enhance crude supply – a move supported by Washington to curb oil prices – Biden’s trip to the Saudi port of Jeddah transpired. Despite the initial greeting between Biden and the young prince appearing lukewarm, US officials contend that the visit cleared misunderstandings and paved the way for future collaborations.
Alterman stated, “The Jeddah visit was aimed at easing tensions, allowing for efficacious dialogues. With the initiation of talks, potential seemed on the horizon.”
However, an uproar ensued over the Opec+ decision in October to scale down output prior to the November midterms, prompting suspicions within angered factions of the government that certain Saudi groups intended to see the Democrats lose.
This was followed by months of near-zero communications, as Riyadh kept its distance from Washington, exemplified by its invitation to Chinese president Xi Jinping for a summit in December. This indicated Saudi Arabia’s growing relationship with a country that, over the past two decades, has become its main oil consumer and business ally.
As tensions subsided and oil prices remained fairly consistent, US officials became convinced that Saudi Arabia’s decision to reduce oil production was driven by market considerations, not political ones, which justified the Saudi approach. Consequently, the lines of communication were gradually re-established. A senior US government representative reflects on the strain during the election period, attributing it to a misunderstanding of Saudi Arabia’s intentions.
“One could say that the relations have improved beyond measure since the start of this administration,” notes a Saudi representative. US officials emphasise the evolving relationship’s scope, suggesting that it extends much further than just oil.
In addition to preventing Saudi Arabia’s further alignment with China, the Biden administration acknowledged the necessity of Riyadh’s collaboration in achieving other goals such as the cessation of the Yemen war and de-escalation of Iran relations. Saudi Arabia’s investment of roughly $100bn (about €93bn) in the US through its Public Investment Fund also helped shape perspectives from 2017 to 2023.
Another high-ranking US official remarks the significance of the relationship in defence and other key areas, as Saudi Arabia is a G20 country.
Over the past ten years, countries in the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, have diversified their international engagements as they felt the US was retracting from the region. However, it’s understood that neither China nor Russia could replace the US’s security or diplomatic role in the area. “[The Saudis] have always known the indispensability of the US,” notes Saudi commentator Ali Shihabi, who is close to the royal court, but he criticises the inconsistency of the US and its use of Saudi Arabia in its domestic politics.
In regard to Israel, both the US and Saudi Arabia would highly value a successful normalisation agreement. In exchange for a US defence pact and nuclear collaboration, Saudi Arabia would initiate formal diplomatic relations with Israel, who would need to make significant progress towards an independent Palestinian state.
The Gaza conflict had the potential to jeopardise peace talks. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken had intended to visit Saudi Arabia to address the Palestinian aspect of the negotiations prior to the attack launched by Hamas on October 7th. However, when Blinken met with Prince Mohammed in Riyadh on October 14th, the conversation was mainly about the ongoing war.
Shortly thereafter, an inaugural phonetic conversation between President Biden and the crown prince highlighted their shared commitment to enhancing efforts towards securing a lasting peace between the Israelis and Palestinians once the crisis had diminished, as per the official White House statement. They consented to progressing the pre-existing work between the US and Saudi Arabia.
That reaffirmed the intention to keep the normalisation talks active. Saudi officials privately indicated their willingness to negotiate, but noted that the dynamics had considerably shifted due to the attacks by Hamas and the subsequent Israeli reprisal actions in Gaza.
The destructiveness of Israel’s reprisal in Gaza incensed Riyadh, despite their disapproval of the militant Islamist group. They came to the understanding that significant Israeli concessions for a viable Palestinian state would be necessary for deal acceptability, which was more than they had anticipated.
Subsequent to these developments, Sullivan, Blinken, McGurk, and Hochstein made several diplomatic visits to the kingdom, conversing over the regional crisis and the US-Saudi aspects of the agreement. However, Israeli prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, is not in favour of a Palestinian state.
Even without a solid agreement, both Saudi and US officials remain confident in preserving this renewed alliance. The regional crisis reiterated the significance of their partnership; the US is ready to recommence weapon sales to Saudi Arabia, who in turn has permitted usage of its airspace to the US, and its allies, to counter Iranian missile and drone attacks that took place in April.
The first senior administration official stated, “The process of working through all of this with Saudi Arabia has, if anything, further clarified our shared interests in the region broadly,” adding that “the progress being made is expected to last.”
Nevertheless, debates surrounding the extent of Prince Mohammed’s reacceptance in Washington continue. China persists as an critical ally for Saudi and Prince Mohammed has maintained ties with Putin, seeking equilibrium in relations between the East and West. Moreover, there continue to be US individuals who contest closer ties between the US and the kingdom.
In Washington, isolationists argue that attaching importance to Saudi Arabia, a country they consider to be losing influence, and depending heavily on oil is a precarious stance. They argue for distancing from Saudi Arabia rather than nurturing a closer relationship, according to Alterman. In addition to this, there is a segment of the left-wing population that believes the US should steer clear from the Saudi regime due to its oppressive nature.
Contrarily, US officials are of the opinion that Riyadh has synchronised its interests more closely with the US, particularly concerning the Ukrainian conflict. Dennis Ross, previously engaged in Middle East negotiations and currently associated with the Washington Institute, states, “While Saudi Arabia isn’t severing its ties with China, they’re certainly focusing more on the relationship they have with us.”
Alterman also points out the impact the Israel-Hamas war has had in redirecting Saudi Arabia’s approach. He remarks that despite initial beliefs about the US losing its stature in the Middle East and the perceived need to cultivate stronger ties with China, the political events since October 7th have seen diplomatic efforts leaning heavily towards the US and not China in a significant way.
However, there are others who opine that Saudi Arabia’s own foreign policy initiatives have successfully redirected Washington’s attention away from persisting worries about violations of human rights. The narrative has shifted, says Firas Maksad from the Middle East Institute, a think-tank based in Washington. As per Maksad, the focus has shifted away from human rights issues, Khashoggi, and Yemen. Nowadays, it’s largely about normalization prospects and budding business opportunities within the kingdom. Copyrighted by The Financial Times Limited 2024.