Certain political academics perceive the essence of the European Union as being strongly rooted in a pact between France and Germany. In the decline of the second World War, Allies forcefully divided Germany and rendered it politically powerless. However, this complete overhaul bore the fruit of vast productivity growth and within a short span, West Germany emerged as the potent financial hub of Europe.
By the year 1989, it had ascended to the third spot among the top economies in the world, only lagging behind Japan and the United States as per the measures of GDP. France, on the other hand, had a relatively wavering economic journey post-war, climaxing in a disastrous lone venture in the early 1980s. This was when Francois Mitterrand’s fleeting “Socialist Experiment” caused an economic turmoil marked by inflation and foreign exchange crisis.
This period highlighted the increasing interconnectedness of the global financial structure and the plausible threats of defying the financial norm. Liz Truss, the former UK Prime Minister’s failed miniature budget in 2022 serves as a contemporary example.
By the 1980s, the momentum of the European project had decelerated considerably. The subsequent strive towards further integration, led by enthusiasts like Jacque Delors and leading to the significant Maastricht treaty of 1993 and consequently the single currency, could not have come to fruition without a binding push from both France and Germany.
According to the pact theory, in exchange for its acceptance of a united Germany and its resurgence as a political entity on the global platform through a politically unified EU, France regained its economic stability.
This process entailed the relinquishing of the control of the continent’s monetary policy from the previously paramount Bundesbank to the joint European Central Bank (ECB).
Indeed, there was no explicit agreement between France and Germany, merely historical events subtly weaving the narrative. The trade-off of politics for economics offers one perspective of interpreting these incidents.
But, what transpires if one of the members in this hypothetical alliance turns antagonistic towards the initiative? This question may soon find its answer.
French leader Emmanuel Macron’s risky decision to hold surprise elections as a reaction to his party’s weak performance in the European elections was designed to jolt France away from the brewing affinity towards the extreme-right politics of Marine Le Pen and her National Rally (RN) party. However, this move propelled Le Pen’s anti-immigrant, Eurosceptic party to the forefront of the parliament and seemingly towards a powerful position, if not immediately, then in the near future.
Michel Barnier, formerly involved in Brexit proceedings for Europe, has attributed Macron to being the catalyst for France’s potential “Frexit” event. Marine Le Pen once supported France’s departure from the EU but has seemed to have deviated from this stance in recent party manifestos, seemingly adapting her message to connect with centrist voters, which has been part of her effort to propel the National Rally (RN) party from marginalized to mainstream.
Throughout the 2000s, she strived to disassociate the RN and herself from her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s, links with neo-fascism and the collaborative Vichy regime. Le Pen personally selected Jordan Bardella, the existing 28-year-old leader of the party, possibly France’s future prime minister, to fully rid the party of its racial prejudice.
Still, Le Pen’s ascension indicates the wave of economic and cultural populism currently overwhelming Europe, as a response to globalization and large-scale immigration. She argues that globalization undermines French traditions and native industries. She believes that global Islam, along with these ideology, intends to dominate France.
The repercussions of the upcoming second-round legislative election remain uncertain. Yet, Le Pen’s progress will scrutinize not only France’s commitment to the EU initiative but also the EU’s functioning at a critical moment with an emerging new cold war and a hostile Russia infringing a neighboring country.
Le Pen intends to enforce a “national preference” policy, favoring French businesses and farming, which contravenes European single market regulations. She also seeks to scrutinize EU free trade agreements that do not honor France and opposes further EU expansion. It has been observed that French voters previously supported Le Pen as a form of government protest, but now there is a desire to give her a chance at governing.
The results of a recent Ipsos poll for the Financial Times showed that the RN was the most trusted party among French citizens to handle the economy and public finances, despite their lack of government experience and allegations of unfunded tax cuts and spending policies.
In France, there could be an emerging situation of “cohabitation”, in which the head of state controls defence and foreign affairs, while right-wing extremism controls domestic policy. There’s a possibility that Macron might be attempting to place further emphasis on his initial gamble and letting Le Pen’s party enter the government so their popularity might dwindle. French voters generally exhibit a faster tendency to become disillusioned with those in power compared to other countries. Nonetheless, allowing right-wing extremism nearer to the seat of power in order to curb its expansion represents a high-risk political strategy. The rise of right-wing populism hasn’t been discouraged by the electorate in other nations, with the US and Italy as notable examples.