The much-anticipated final report of the 1,700-page Grenfell Tower inquiry regarding the lethal blaze in West London that claimed 72 lives in 2017 has seen the light of day. It offers insights into the various failings that precipitated the disaster.
A multitude of parties were implicated in precipitating the catastrophe. The conflagration was identified as the climax of several decades of negligence by the central government and other influential entities in the construction sector, ignoring the perils of integrating flammable materials into the external facades of towering residential edifices and failing to act upon the data at their disposal.
Held accountable for the incident by the report were the designers at Studio E, the construction firms Rydon and Harley Facades, as well as the building control department in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea.
Moving to the topic of the cladding that largely fostered the rapidly spreading flames, sharp rebukes were reserved for several companies. Arconic, the US firm that provided the fire conducive plastic-filled cladding panels; Celotex, the major producer of the flammable foam insulation; and Kingspan, an Irish company that produced some of the insulation, all faced severe criticism.
The landlord’s function was another area of focus. The Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, appointed by the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea to oversee their council housing portfolio, spearheaded the refurbishment project. The chief executive of the organisation, Robert Black, was seen to perpetuate a “culture of obscuring…pertaining to fire safety issues”. It was documented that the TMO viewed managing fire safety concerns as a mere nuisance. One of the first intentions for cladding Grenfell Tower was aesthetic improvement and to prevent it from appearing inferior compared to the neighbouring building. Suggestions with regards to enhancing energy efficiency followed. The report highlighted an unabating preoccupation with curtailing expenses.
The document delineated tensions with a resident activist, Ed Daffarn, portrayed as “an intelligent, articulate and determined individual”, who, along with peers, deemed the landlord’s operational conduct as wanting and raised objections to the choice of architect. He ran a blog where they passionately disputed the landlord’s actions.
The investigation into TMO’s handling of the situation revealed that the attitude and language used by Daffarn created a sense of friction amongst its staff. The inquiry succinctly expressed that his presence became a hindrance to open communication with the larger community due to the apprehension of those at TMO who were in charge of the refurbishment works. Despite this, the investigation conveyed that Daffarn’s conciliatory approach could have potentially invited similar actions from TMO, had it not been overly guarded in its interactions.
The aftermath of the scenario has left the survivors and the bereaved enduring lasting psychological distress, sending their lives into a drastic tailspin. The inquiry has painstakingly detailed the chilling circumstances surrounding the demise of each person, most of whom struggled futilely to break away from the captivating grip of the flames and smoke in the top floors. Short life stories of each victim have been included and it was found that three of them plummeted to their death from the building.
It was revealed through the report that survivors had been severely let down and left defenceless, without access to critical information in the immediate aftermath of the fire. The visually haunting scene was likened to a horror movie or a battleground by witnesses. Those in the desperate search for loved ones were consumed by an overwhelming sense of hopelessness and despair.
The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, in many instances, failed in its responsibility to provide timely emergency accommodation. The inadequate food arrangements at some hotels pushed some residents into a state where they felt displaced, akin to refugees. As described by the survivors, this sense of neglect left them in a state of suspended existence, hindering their healing process.
The credibility of the Building Research Establishment, a now-privatised former state-run institution in charge of full-scale fire tests, was compromised due to its involvement with Celotex and Kingspan for testing insulation. The inquiry concluded that the fire-tests carried out by the entity were plagued by unprofessional behaviour, lax practices, poor supervisory methods, inefficient reporting, and a lack of scientific precision. The inquiry further noted the vulnerability of the establishment to manipulation by untrustworthy product manufacturers, due to these shortcomings.
Arconic, thus far, has refuted allegations of marketing an unsafe product, claiming that it was authorised for sale in the UK. The company has defended itself saying that it upheld the practise of routinely testing its products through independent testing agencies, with all the findings being publicly accessible. The company testified its commitment to transparency by ensuring that these reports were accessible to its clients.
The original statement highlighted that no information was concealed or misrepresented to any certification body, customer, or the general public. Over seven years, a public inquiry was conducted, which spanned more than 400 days. However, the probe was not without challenges, including interruptions due to the Covid-19 pandemic, an unwillingness of witnesses from the cladding firm, Arconic to appear, and a puzzling blame-triangle among nearly three dozen companies and institutions involved. Consequently, the inquiry had to reach out to around 250 individuals who were under critique and needed prior notice of the final findings, thus causing further delays. To the public’s dismay, the whole process has cost the taxpayers more than £200m.
One of the major concerns raised by the inquiry was the issuance of deceptive certificate associated with the products of Arconic, Kingspan and Celotex; a clear indication of a serious breakdown of the system, demonstrating a pressing need to reform product certification in construction. The need for a construction regulator is underscored in the inquiry, tasked with assessing the legality and conformity of construction materials, and issuing certificates to prevent reoccurrence of similar issues.
Moreover, one of the key contributions to the Grenfell disaster was the ambiguity prevalent in building regulations. Grenfell Inquiry’s chair, Sir Martin Moore-Bick pointed out that the current guidance is still not sufficient to design buildings that are fire-safe. Therefore, the panel has suggested an urgent review and annual or prompt amendments of the guidance.
Now, the UK Government is expected to react to the recommendations put forth by Moore-Bick and the panel, in a bid to avert any similar incidents in the future. The bereft, survivors, and residents are expecting assurance of the follow-ups to these suggestions. A substantial police investigation is currently underway, possibly uncovering corporate manslaughter, fraud and public office misconduct charges. However, any trial could potentially be postponed until 2027 or later.