The manner in which the decrease of American supremacy has been governed by Joe Biden has been more skilful than his recent forerunners, which is unfortunate given how negatively the expression “managing decrease” is perceived, particularly in Britain. We ought to be more mature about this. A multitude of nations, such as Spain, Egypt, and Japan, have now surpassed the zenith of their power. The method by which this transition is guided is of great importance to their hundreds of millions of inhabitants, and can be executed with either competence or ineptitude.
The Ford Motor Company will never have the luminary status it had in the mid-20th century, however, its 177,000 employees greatly care about how efficiently its decrease is maneuvered. What else should a person do in their later years apart from managing decrease?
In 1945, the US had monopoly over nuclear power. By 1960, it boasted 40 per cent of global output. Neither of these will be reclaimed. Therefore, the role of every US president is to oversee this decrease. Joe Biden has performed this noble duty more efficiently than many who came before him.
George W. Bush had an inflated and ultimately detrimental belief in what the US could accomplish in Iraq and Afghanistan. Barack Obama pulled back excessively. Uncertain about America’s physical or moral capability to shape events, he took a tentative stance against Russian aggression in Crimea and made a noncommittal stand against the use of chemical weapons in Syria. The extent to which this uncertainty empowered the West’s rivals in the ensuing years is something we can only speculate about.
Donald Trump, irrespective of his Republican affiliation, he is more like Obama than Bush. Despite his nationalism, he is a declinist. His dislikes, including trade deficits, allied free riders, and military interventions, suggest he sees US power as a diminishing resource to be guarded fervently. Those who are closest to him in the Republican party, the Asia First group, see each financial aid to Ukraine as a wasteful expenditure of limited resources, which should instead be saved for the more significant threat posed by China.
This perspective could certainly be viewed as simplistically sound, however, it neglects to consider the potential geopolitical rewards that come with showcasing power in one area (for instance, would the USA’s standing in Asia escalate or diminish if it permitted Ukraine’s collapse?), implying a rather defeatist attitude towards US influence.
In the realm of recent American leadership, Biden has executed a remarkable equilibrium. There have been no escapades reminiscent of Bush’s tenure, though this is arguably the least complex aspect. The challenge lies in sidestepping overcompensation: to refuse the narratives of US fallibility from weakening an otherwise formidable powerhouse.
Take for instance, Biden’s bold stance in Europe. As 2021 neared its conclusion, he was already aware of Russia’s impending assault on Ukraine, and he made this known globally. He supplied Ukraine adequately to counteract the invader for over two and half years, albeit with room for increased intervention.
Under Biden’s administration, NATO, which was previously in search of purpose, has welcomed new participants, while existing members gear up. The alliance, amplifying US potency, has been reinvigorated for the foreseeable future.
This intensification in European engagement did not compromise the focus on Asia, thanks to the Aukus pact that potentially includes Japan and strengthens American clout. The heads of government convened at the “Quad” inaugural meetings, while countries like the Philippines and Vietnam fortify ties with the US. Biden’s firm position on Taiwan could even be benchmarked against Trump’s assertions.
The era of American hubris has decidedly ended. The imminent threat now is self-fulfilled diminution. How has Biden managed to navigate this predicament?
Biden seems to grasp the critical nuance of imperial decline: its longevity. A superpower can extend its superiority for numerous decades or even centuries following the initial challenge to its economic dominance. Britain started losing its industrial advantage in the 1800s, yet the territorial expanse of its empire prolonged till the 1920s. Despite being a weary debtor, Britain secured a permanent position in the UN in 1945. This illustrates that even beyond its prime, a state can maintain a global presence, as exemplified by Russia itself.
Edward Gibbon did not pen six volumes on the demise of the Roman empire because of a verbal diarrhoea or his unfulfilled romantic life, which might have furnished him with a surplus of energy. The actual reason was that Rome’s faltering and fall was a protracted event in history. His chronicle, that synchronised with the American Revolution, is often examined for possible lessons that an empire in distress on the Potomac could learn from a collapsed empire on the Tiber. One lesson might be that, between a pinnacle and eventual breakdown, a significant amount of work could be accomplished. It possibly required someone who ascended to the president’s office at the age of 78 to comprehend this point.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2024.